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ABSTRACT
The process of professionalization initiated by the Peruvian army in 1896 under
French influence did not withdraw the military from political involvement. On the
contrary, as the process of professionalization advanced, the army developed a
“professional militarism, ” that is, military political participation for reasons based on
the institution’s professional ethos. The Peruvian army had traditionally claimed a broad
military jurisdiction including extra- military roles. French instructors reinforced such
claimed incorporating a broad military jurisdiction into the army’s professional ethos,
which justified military coups during the twentieth-century as well as the Revolutionary
Government of the Armed Forces (1968-1980).
Historians Frederick M. Nunn and Daniel M. Masterson do not take sufficiently
into account the impact of nineteenth-century militarism on Peruvian military thought.
These scholars argued that Peruvian officers were aping their French mentors when
twentieth-century military magazines claimed nation building as a defense prerequisite
or when “Francophile” officers declared a civilizing and social mission for the army.
However, in 1888, over 120 Peruvian officers established the Centro Militar del
Perú and published the Revista Militar y Naval, which systematized the “military mind”
born from the century’ s military experience. The articles in the Revista demonstrate that
before the process of professionalization initiated in 1896, the Peruvian military mind
consisted of attitudes and perspectives stressing the necessity of a strong military, the
supremacy of society over the individual, the destructiveness of civilian partisan
politics, and a broad military jurisdiction, which included administrative, nationbuilding, civilizing, and constitutional guardian functions. Consequently, this thesis

iv

focuses on nineteenth-century militarism and political culture arguing that by late 1880s
the essential elements of the Peruvian military mind behind twentieth-century
“professional militarism” had already come together.

v

CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
In 1968 General Juan Velasco Alvarado, commandant of the army and the Joint
Command, inaugurated the Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces (19681980) after a so-called institutional coup had exiled the constitutional president. The
self-defined mission of the new military regime was to find solutions for basic national
problems as seen through the military ethos and with the consent and participation of
the three branches of service.
Economic problems, demonstrations by land-hungry peasants, a demand from
urban sectors for state services, denunciations of a petroleum contract harmful to
national interests, and the failure of long-awaited reforms became the detonator of the
1968 coup. The military administration tried to alter the country’s socioeconomic
structures in accordance with a concept of national security that made economic
development and modernization a necessary component of national defense against both
internal enemies (i.e., Communists) and external enemies. The projected reforms
included industrialization, a modern communication system, a redistribution of wealth,
land reform, and the absorption of lower-class pressures by the political system –
without direct popular participation or tolerance of political opposition. 1
The Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces has received widespread
scholarly attention because it stands in opposition to the short-term personalistic or
gendarme administrations established by military coups since independence in the early
1820s. Peruvian scholars like Henry Pease and Julio Cotler ha ve emphasized the post1945 era of accelerated industrialization and urbanization as the point at which the

1

Henry Pease García, El Ocaso del Poder Oligárquico: Lucha política en la escena oficial, 1968-1975,
15-17.
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interests of the Peruvian armed forces and those of the agro-export and landed oligarchy
separated. 2
Historian Frederick M. Nunn recognizes the importance of environmental
factors in the 1968 coup, but stresses the evolution of military ideologically in the
twentieth century. He argues that the French influence explains why dominant sectors
of the Peruvian officer corps gradually developed the idea that it would be impossible to
create a cohesive, disciplined social order and maintain a powerful military
establishment under a civilian-dominated political system that generated only
factionalism. 3
Between 1896 and 1940, Peru contracted several French military missions and
advisors to help modernize and professionalize the army not only to improve the
country’s military capabilities, but to end the intervention of military caudillos in
national politics. According to Nunn, French officers transmitted to their Peruvian
officer-students their own thoughts about State, nation, and politics, which included the
notion that army officers should play a broad role in society. French military
professionalism emphasized authority, hierarchy, social responsibility, and the
supremacy of national interests, while it scorned the excesses of individualism,
egalitarianism, factionalism, and materialism allegedly brought to civilian society by
liberal democracy and capitalism. In this light, the army stood as the perfect link
between nation and State because it was a microcosm of society upholding collective,
rather than factional, interests. The army united past, present, and future, harmoniously
blending tradition and modernity by combining hierarchy and democracy into a sort of
2

Ibid., 21-41; Julio Cotler, Clases, Estado y Nación en el Perú, 318-326.
Frederick M. Nunn, Yesterday’s Soldiers: European Military Professionalism in South America, 18901940.
3
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corporate democracy. Any man could advance through the ranks due to merit being
completely equal to those sharing his rank, obedient to those above him, and leader to
those below him. The army was a school of patriotism and the officer corps a vanguard
of civilizing agents. 4
Examining the content of Peruvian military publications, Nunn establishes a
correlation between the themes and topics they contained after 1904 and French military
thought. He concludes that the pupils imitated the teachers. Absorbing French concepts,
Peruvian officers became progressively disenchanted with the gap between republican
political institutions, that supposedly should have guided the country toward progress
and peace, and the country’s economic, social, and political underdevelopment.
Convinced of the vital connection between development and defense, their own broad
role in society, and the unsuitability of civilian institutions, Peruvian officers turned
French military professionalism by the 1930s into a “professional militarism,” that is,
the propensity to military-political action based on a professional ethos. 5
Although Nunn indicates that the professionalization initiated in 1896 under
French influence formed a military mentality that remained unchanged by American
military influence in South America after WWII, he limits his study to the 1896-1940
period when French ideology took root in the Peruvian army. 6 Historian Daniel M.
Masterson extends Nunn’s thesis to the late twentie th century by demonstrating the
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Ibid., 22-23, 291.
Ibid., xi, 2,136-37, 285. This work defines militarism as the lack of civilian control over the military,
which actively participates in politics.
6
Ibid., 251.
5
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strength of French teachings in Peru’s military literature, its military institutions, its
officer corps, and the Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces. 7
Nunn and Masterson, however, do not take sufficiently into account the impact
of nineteenth-century militarism on Peruvian military thought. Indeed, Masterson
dismisses it as simply the result of an unprofessional officer corps,
By Samuel Huntington’s classic definition of military professionalism, . . . the Latin
American military establishments of the nineteenth century were woefully amateurish.
Without a sense of corporate identity built upon tradition, discipline, and institutional
self-esteem, Latin American military men lacked a sense of responsibility to their
profession and to their nation. 8

The central argument of this thesis is that the main elements of Peruvian military
thought that underlay the 1968 movement had their roots in nineteenth century domestic
conditions and had coalesced by the early 1890s. In other words, the nineteenth century
witnessed the evolvement of a “military mentality” that integrated the basic notions
supposedly introduced by the French military missions. Explicitly espoused by over 120
military officers in the late 1880s and early 1890s, this mentality included the criticism
of political factionalism, a disdain of civilian values, the perception of the army as the
only truly national and democratic institution, and a broad social role or civilizing
mission for the officer corps. These officers, mostly from the army and including the
surviving heroes of the War of the Pacific (1879-1883), formed an organization called
the Centro Militar del Perú and gave voice to their ideas in a new journal, the Revista
Militar y Naval, the first issue of which appeared on 1 April 1888.

7

Daniel M. Masterson, Militarism and Politics in Latin America: Peru from Sánchez Cerro to Sendero
Luminoso.
8
Ibid., 11. Samuel P. Huntington defines a professional officer corps in terms of its corporateness,
expertise, and responsibility, see The Soldier and The State: The Theory and Practice of Civil-Military
Relations, 7-18.
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The military mindset reflected in the Revista prior to the arrival of the first
French military mission evolved out of nineteenth-century caudillismo and the political
culture that encouraged it. Signs of an ideological debt to Europe do appear clearly in
the pages of the Revista, where Peruvian officers regularly discussed French and
German military. However, the essence of this military mind had been formed by
decades of military political involvement fueled by the contradictory political culture
established after the end of Spanish authority.
The republican political culture that emerged after the wars of independence that is, the assumptions, expectations, and behaviors relevant to the handling of public
affairs - harbored contradictory elements defining unclearly the concepts of the new
language such as popular sovereignty, public opinion, representative government,
reason, egalitarianism, and freedom. For instance, if reason should guide society
towards happiness, how could sovereignty reside in the people at large, being most of
them ignorant? In this way, elitist and authoritarian ideologies coexisted with egalitarian
notions to form the new constitutional language. 9 The ambiguity of the criollo elite
towards independence, its subsequent ideological disputes, and the breach between
constitutional theory and reality created a political vacuum after the crumbling of
Spanish authority. In the midst of this crisis of legitimacy, violence became the other
side of the political coin, allowing and encouraging caudillismo.
In this environment of institutional weakness and external military threat, army
officers expanded the army’s jurisdiction, “a legitimate claim to apply its expertise to
specific situations,” through three channels: (1) a legal channel, the law defining who
could perform certain tasks, (2) public opinion, and (3) the actual performance of a task
9

Cristóbal Aljovín de Losada, Caudillos y Constituciones: Perú 1821-1845, 73-119.
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or exercise of authority. 10 Most Peruvian constitutions entrusted the armed forces with
the protection of the political system, giving the military a constitutional political role. 11
Army officers, viewing themselves as agents civilization, also took on nation-building
and administrative functions among their Indian troops or as appointed provincial
prefects. Disgruntled urban sectors and political factions, moreover, often supported the
seizure of power by different military caudillos, who thus could claim to be acting in the
name of popular sovereignty and public opinion.
By the 1880s, the army, with a military mind nurtured by the national political
culture, was a professionalizing institution attempting to establish a broad jurisdiction.
Although the nineteenth-century Peruvian army was not a professional one according to
Huntington’s definition because of its lack of corporateness and expertise, as well as its
interference in politics, the officer class regarded military service as a profession. After
all, it was a full-time occupation serving society and was, too, a life- long calling - at
least in the view of military practitioners. As recognized by different Peruvian
governments of the 1800s in their attempts to established military academies, the career
of arms required theoretical education and consisted of specialized knowledge. 12
Nineteenth-century Peruvian militarism provided important elements that, in
conjunction with the process of professionalization under French tutelage, and
environmental factors during the twentieth century, transformed military
professionalism into professional militarism, which stood behind the Revolutionary
Government of the Armed Forces. Illuminating the origin of Peruvian professional

10

Don M. Snider and Gayle L. Watkins, “The Future of Army Professionalism: A Need for Renewal and
Redefinition,” Parameters 30 (Autum 2000), 16.
11
Brian Loveman, The Constitution of Tyranny: Regimes of Exception in Spanish America, 6.
12
Snider and Watkins, “Army Professionalism,” 13; Alfredo Muñoz, Las Escuelas Militares del Perú.
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militarism provides a better understanding of the twentieth-century military behavior,
which is crucial to any attempt to comprehend civil- military relations in that country.

7

CHAPTER 2. THE COMING OF INDEPENDENCE
The Inca Empire that Francisco Pizarro placed under Spanish rule in 1532
extended from southern Colombia to northern Chile and from the Pacific Ocean to the
Amazonian rain forest including most of Bolivia and northwestern Argentina. Such vast
territory became the viceroyalty of Peru with Lima as its capital on the Pacific coast.
Thereafter, other expeditions conquered the rest of South America, except for
Portugal’s Brazil, expanding the viceroyalty.
Spanish authority in South America lasted almost three hundred years sustained
by a civil administration, the Catholic Church, and a military force. However, in 1808
Spain fell to Napoleon, which ushered in a period of instability that would lead to the
Spanish American wars of independence. A directive body called the Junta Central and
later a smaller Council of Regency governed in name of the Spanish king, Ferdinand
VII, defying French occupation. Liberal elements in Spain transformed the empire’s
absolutist government, where the monarch ruled without interference from society, into
a constitutional monarchy and summoned a Cortes or parliament with representatives
from all over the empire. Delegates from the Americas wanted equal representation for
the colonies in the Cortes, equality of access to public office for colonials, and the
removal of mercantilist economic restrictions on agriculture, industry, mining, and
trade. But the Regency simply could not grant Americans equal representation or free
commerce, which would constitute de facto independence. Although sentiment in favor

8

of independence manifested itself in Mexico, Buenos Aires, Quito, and Chile, Lima
could not commit to revolution. 1
A sense of Peruvianism had existed since the late 1700s and found expression in
certain organizations set up under Enlightenment influence and devoted to the study of
practical aspects of local society. The activities of such organizations stimulated interest
in Peruvian reality on the part of the criollo, or Peruvian-born white, elite and wer an
important step toward the development of patriotic sentiment. But there was no
consensus about what form a Peruvian patria should take. Most liberals in Peru believed
the patria would benefit the most from a constitutional monarchy within the Spanish
Empire while others, a more radical minority, advocated complete separation from
Spain with a republican model. Absolutists, on the other hand, argued that Peru’s future
depended on Spanish protection and the reversal of certain reforms introduced by the
Bourbons. The only points of agreement among politically motivated Peruvians lay in
their rejection of both freedom of religion and the participation of the racially mixed
lower classes and indigenous peoples in politics. To complicate matters further, regional
disputes between Lima and southern cities, Arequipa and Cuzco, flourished as
possibilities of a political reorganization were considered. 2
The lack of cohesion among the Peruvian elite before, during, and after the war
of independence in the 1820s set the stage for the political instability of the early
republican era, which gave way to and nurtured caudillismo - the intervention of

1

J. R. Fis her, Government and Society in Colonial Peru: The Intendant System, 1784-1814, 201-203;
Timothy E. Anna, The Fall of the Royal Government in Peru, 40, 47, 107; John Lynch, The Spanish
American Revolutions, 1808-1826, 35-36.
2
Lynch, Spanish American, 33, 162; Fisher, Intendant System, 233; Charles F. Walker, Smoldering
Ashes: Cuzco and the Creation of Republican Peru, 1780-1840, 85; Fredrick Pike, The Modern History of
Peru, 41-44; Paul Gootenberg, “North-South: Trade Policy, Regionalism, and Caudillismo in PostIndependence Peru,” Journal of Latin American Studies 23 (May), 273-308.
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military chiefs in regional and national politics and resultant personalistic regimes. 3 The
sources of ambiguity and divergence within the Peruvian elite and the emerging
national political culture that allowed the caudillos to thrive were diverse.
Peruvian criollos shared a strong fear of social upheaval, which prevented many
of them from committing to independence until Simón Bolívar and the Army of
Liberation delivered it in 1824. That fear steamed from the fact that the white
population of Peru, mostly concentrated in coastal cities, was numerically small vis-àvis the oppressed masses of Indian, African slaves, and mixed-blood.
Although whites, Indians, and blacks were segregated, the neat social divisions
soon blurred due to miscegenation. As the number of mixed-bloods increased, social
tensions sharpened. Several different social categories, recognized in Spanish law,
attempted to define the degree of whiteness, “indianess,” and blackness in each mixedblood individual. Nevertheless, cultural, social, and economic characteristics, in
addition to race, determined the caste system. For example, an Indian who moved to the
city and learned Spanish immediately became a mestizo - originally the offspring of an
Indian and a Spaniard - and stopped paying tribute. A mulatto or free colored could buy
a certificate of whiteness, which enabled him to join religious orders, schools, and
marry whites. Thus, the possibility of social mobilization existed, fueling the masses’
pressure for social betterment. 4
Indians composed the majority of the population and resided mainly in the
highlands. The viceroy, the king’s alter ego in the colonies, along with other judicial,

3

During the late nineteenth and twentieth century, the meaning of caudillo expanded to describe civilian
or military dictators.
4
Pike, Modern, 30; Lynch, Spanish American, 20-21; Julio Cotler, Clases, Estado y Nación en el Perú,
33-39.
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treasury, and high ecclesiastical authorities lived in Lima, which meant that the
authorities closest to the native population were the corregidores or Indian agents and
the caciques, or traditional Indian chiefs who mediated between the Indians and the
Spanish authorities. During the seventeen century, the crown stopped paying salaries to
these local authorities and authorized them to become traders and landlords. The
corregidores utilized Indians, with the crown’s acquiescence, as free laborers and
coerced buyers of the pricey, useless goods - called repartimientos - sold in their
jurisdictions ; at the same time the agents circumvented colonial laws protecting Indian
community lands and pocketed the extra money they collected from the Indian tribute. 5
The annual Indian tribute or head tax, the repartimientos, and the mita compulsory labor for the government at mines, haciendas, or factories - forced the
formerly self- sufficient native communities into the market economy. Alliances soon
developed between local authorities and socioeconomic elites, including priests,
hacendados, and merchants, to turn Indians into serfs through the mechanism of debt
manipulation. For example, a new worker at a hacienda would receive a loan against his
future wages in order to buy tools at the hacienda’s general store. Then he would recive
most or all of his meager salary in chits redeemable only at the general store, a
procedure that kept him in debt and at work since most haciendas had their own jail and
enforced their own regulations. 6
But not only the masses pressed for social betterment. Upper class mestizos and
criollos lived in the Spaniard social world aspiring to the same privileges enjoyed by
peninsular-born whites (peninsulares), but became increasingly embittered when denied
5

Lynch, Spanish American, 8; Cotler, Clases, 26-27.
Pike, Modern, 27-29; Rex A. Hudson, ed., Peru: A Country Study, 20-21,102-103; Cotler, Clases, 2324.
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access to higher royal offices and other social distinctions because of their colonial
birth. 7 In this way, the criollo elite, although having some grievances of its own towards
the Crown, had several reasons to fear a racial war if control over the masses weakened
due to revolution. This fear increased as the minor, unorganized Indian revolts became
more frequent and violent throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
Economic reasons also weighted heavily in the lack of criollo commitment to
independence. In the 1700 the French Bourbon ruling family replaced the Hapsburgs on
the Spanish throne and initiated a series of administrative, economic, and military
reforms to improve the economic and military position of Spain and her colonies so as
to permit Spain to keep pace with the British. Bourbon worries about English
commercial aggressiveness and possible territorial aspirations in Spanish America
increased as Cape Horn’s invulnerability decreased. 8
In order to facilitate administration and improve the defenses of South America,
the Crown created the viceroyalty of New Granada in 1739 and the viceroyalty of Río
de la Plata in 1776 while Chile, as a captaincy general, became virtually independent
from Peru. The addition of the silver-rich Upper Peru (present-day Bolivia) to the
viceroyalty of Río de la Plata and the abolition of the fleet system jolted Peru’s
economy, which had revolved around a monopoly on direct trade between South
America and the mother country. As Madrid opened more ports in South America to
imports from Spain, the Peruvian harbor of Callao could not compete with those on the
Atlantic and Peru’s incipient manufacturing sector declined under the pressure of
imported goods now coming through Buenos Aires and the loss of the Upper Peru

7
8

Lynch, Spanish American, 18, 159.
Leon G. Campbell, The Military and Society in Colonial Peru, 1750-1810, 9-10.
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market. Peru, moreover, was forced to subsidize its new commercial competitors. 9 The
Peruvian criollo elite could not agree on a solution to the viceroyalty’s economic
decline. Some argued for a return to the pre-Bourbon reforms while others claimed the
reforms had not gone far enough in the direction of free trade.
Most of the Peruvian elite, moreover, resided in Lima and did not own extensive
properties, its status depend ing more on royal appointment. Consequently, although a
small group of criollos had been influenced by the Enlightenment philosophers and
sought political equality with Spaniards, economic autonomy, free trade, and better
treatment of Indian, their socio-economic dependency on the Crown made them
reformers and not revolutionaries. 10
In 1777, the Crown initiated drastic tax reform, abolishing various special
concessions and taxing formerly exempt sectors of the population and economic
activities. Exploitation of Indian increased as economic elites and corregidores passed
on to them the new burdens imposed by royal reform. Tax revolts soon exploded all
over the viceroyalty with criollo, mestizo, mulatto, and Indian participation due to the
all-encompassing effects of the measures. Several of the newly introduced provincial
militia units showed themselves either ambiguous - by not restraining the local mobs or clearly opposed to the Crown’s interests by providing support to the rebellious
citizenry. Consequently, a bitter debate about the loyalty and effectiveness of the
provincial militia ragged throughout the viceroyalty.

11

Hapsburg military policy had relied on regular or veteran Spanish forces and
fixed fortifications as the first line of defense while keeping militias - mostly in the
9

Pike, Modern, 32; Anna, Royal Government, 4-7; Lynch, Spanish American, 13; Hudson, Peru, 18.
Anna, Royal Government, 24, 30-32; Lynch, Spanish American, 18.
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coast and composed of mulattoes - as a manpower pool. The expense of sending regular
troops and raising fixed regiments in the colonies forced the Bourbons to introduce
provincial militias, raised and manned locally, as tactical units in addition to a small
regular and fixed component working mainly as trainers and command staff. 12
The command of these provincial militias went to the most prominent criollo
families capable of outfitting and raising troops. Provincial militia commandants
received in exchange several distinctions such as membership in a Spanish military
order and the military fuero - or exemption from the payment of certain taxes, from
quartering soldiers, from the payment of jail cell fees, and in some instances from
payment of tribute for officers and sergeants. Despite the Crown’s desire to fill all
superior positions with noble elements that would balance the participation of Indians,
mulattoes, and mestizos in the ranks, the creation of segregated units and the lack of
enough white officers opened sergeant and lieutenant positions for mixed-bloods and
colored people. 13
Even before the tax revolts, geography and economy had defeated the provincial
militia experiment. The wide dispersion of haciendas and towns where militiamen lived,
the lack of available and sufficiently paid training cadres, and the Crown’s innability to
reimburse militia members’ economic loses during training all contributed to the militia
problem. Nevertheless, the Bourbon military reform transformed the army into a more
Peruvian institution. Although Spaniards dominated the provincial militia upper
echelons, criollo and non-white militia officers outnumbered peninsulares. 14

12

Lynch, Spanish American, 10; Campbell, Colonial Peru, 19, 23.
Campbell, Colonial Peru, 35-40, 59, 190.
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Ibid., 53-54, 66-67.
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On November 4, 1780 a young mestizo cacique, José Gabriel Condorcanqui,
took on the alias Inca Túpac Amaru II and seized the Spanish Corregidor of Tinta in
Cuzco. Accused of extorting the Indians in his jurisdiction, the corregidor was tried,
sentenced, and executed a few days later by the Inca without militia interference. Lima
sent its provincial militia and regular army under Spanish command to crush the
rebellion in Cuzco since the militias of that region could not be trusted. Túpac Amaru
proclaimed his movement to be against only “bad government” and corrupt Spanish
authorities, but he could not control the masses of oppressed Indians who saw in all
whites their oppressors. In April 1781, a criollo accomplice betrayed Túpac Amaru. The
following month, the Crown put the heads of Túpac Amaru, his family, and some of his
lieutenants on public display to discourage other would-be rebels. 15
In the wake of the rebellion, the Crown accelerated administrative reform,
abolishing the repartimiento, establishing a high court of justice in Cuzco, and
implanting in 1784 the intendant system. Eight salaried, Spaniard-born intendants, with
extensive judicial, financial, and military authority, replaced the corregidores, many of
whom had become financially independent, in order to centralize power, improve
regional administration, and stimulate regional economies. Although the collection of
taxes improved, the new system Heightened rivalries among public authorities, failed to
supervise adequately the poorly paid subordinate officials who kept alive the illegal
repartimiento, and, ultimately, could not reverse Peru’s economic stagnation. 16
The participation or ambiguous behavior of some criollos and mestizos during
the tax revolts and the Túpac Amaru rebellion resulted in the Crown’s removal of non15

Pike, Modern, 33-35; Anna, Royal Government, 29-30; Campbell, Colonial Peru, 111-115, 134-135,
145-146.
16
Fisher, Intendant System, 33-38, 47, 235-36; Lynch, Spanish American, 9; Pike, Modern, 31.
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peninsular born whites from certain royal offices and the return to regular, fixed units as
the first line of defense. In addition, criollos were passed up for military promotions and
rewards. In this way, criollo loyalty was under suspicion and Peruvians saw their access
to military and bureaucratic careers halted. 17 Although this caused resentment among
white colonials toward the Crown, the Túpac Amaru rebellion had stamped in their
minds the violence that could be unleashed during a war of independence and the
suffering awaiting whites who lacked the protection of royal troops. In 1814, another
revolt with massive Indian participation aggravated criollo fears of a racial war.
After 1809 several independence movements sprang up throughout South
America. Viceroy José Fernando de Abascal y Sousa (1806-1816) raised militias to
fight revolutionary movements in and outside Peru. The viceroyalty’s economic
weakness and the lack of Spanish reinforcements forced him to give command to those
criollos and non-whites contributing private funds to the war effort. Nevertheless, the
army remained firmly in Spanish hands as Peruvians had limited access to field grade
officer ranks, which inevitable deepened tension between peninsulares and criollos.
Moreover, the mobilization was an additiona l blow to Peru’s economy as its mining
sector collapsed in 1812 and Lima became dependent on Chilean wheat and other
imported foodstuff. 18
The liberal Cádiz Constitution of 1812 introduced a new vocabulary and a new
way of political participation into the colonies. Sovereignty emanated from the people
to create a representative government - a constitutional monarchy -, the constitution was

17

Campbell, Colonial Peru, 154-158, 164-166, 172-176; Anna, Royal Government, 30; Lynch, Spanish
American, 11.
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Anna, Royal Government, 6-9; Campbell, Colonial Peru, 210-216, 223, 226; Lynch, Spanish
American, 163.
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an expression of a social contract established through reason rather than tradition, and
all citizens were equal before the law. However, representation, popular sovereignty,
equality, and liberty co-existed with socio-political hierarchies in corporate societies
creating contradiction and unpredictability in times of revolution. 19
Abascal’s successor, Viceroy Joaquín de la Pezuela, did not survive the political
confusion coming from Spain. In 1814 the restoration of Ferdinand VII had meant a
return to absolutism, but in December 1820 liberal elements in the Spanish army
mutinied reestablishing the Constitution of 1812, which would be again abolished by
the king almost three years later. The Spanish political instability in Spain weakened
Pezuela’s absolutist position and after several military reverses culminating in the loss
of Chile to the forces of José de San Martín, a young group of Spanish liberal officers
bloodlessly deposed him on January 29, 1821 in favor of General José de la Serna. It
seemed obvious for many criollos that the colonial government had started to crumble
and that the independence was inevitable in view of San Martín’s control of Chile.
Consequently, important segments of the elite, as well as those aspir ing to upward
social mobility, decided that the time had come to bet on independence and ensure for
themselves a position of future leadership. 20
From Chile, José de San Martín launched a costly Argentine-Chilean expedition
towards Peru. San Martín wanted to rally Peruvians under the banner of freedom, which
was the justification for separation from Spain, rather than occup y Lima and force it
upon the citizens. He moved north of Lima besieging it with the help of the Chilean

19

Cristóbal Aljovín de Losada, Caudillos y Constituciones: Peru 1821-1845, 73-76; Fisher, Intendant
System, 200, 206, 212-216; Anna, Royal Government, 76-77, 89.
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navy and Peruvian montoneras, which were spontaneous guerrilla bands led by
mestizos, Indians, and even criollos seeking vengeance, boot, or perhaps independence.
Such groups acted without much coordination among themselves and at times in
opposition to one another because of personal or regional disputes. 21
San Martín’s idea of a constitutional monarchy for Peru eased criollos’ fears of
anarchy and social revolution. By May 1821 the north had pronounced itself for
independence after the intendant of Trujillo, Marquis of Torre Tagle, joined San Martín.
The viceroy evacuated Lima in July, deciding to concentrate royalist forces in Cuzco.
The cabildo, or town council, invited San Martín into the capital after the viceroy left,
primarily because they feared a slave revolt and the montoneras. San Martín officially
proclaimed Peruvian independence on July 28, 1821, a pronouncement that roughed off
an exodus of many loyal Spaniards and criollos, who abandoned property and family in
Peru. 22
San Martín took care to involve the criollo aristocracy militarily and politically
in the independence movement. In August 1821 he created the military unit Legión
Peruana de la Guardia under the command of the Marquis of Torre Tagle, which is
officially the founding unit of the Peruvian army. 23 San Martín also organized the
Sociedad Patriótica, a select group of criollos charged with deciding on the most
suitable type of government for Peru, which developed into a politico- ideological
battlefield. Plans for a republic met with no major opposition in Peru, for most of the
staunch absolutists fled or been expelled and those favoring a representative
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government in the form of a constitutional monarchy could not produce a Peruvian king
to ease nationalist concerns. Consequently, the political debate occurred within the
framework of republican theory and language. 24
By the time the new Latin American republics were writing their constitutions,
the notions of the Enlightenment and the French and North American revolutions shared
the spot light with those of post-revolutionary thinkers who feared Jacobean excesses
and despaired over the challenges presented by republican states. Most Peruvian
political leaders agreed on the virtues of separation of powers and a representative
government, which was considered a sign of progress and civilization, where the rule of
law would protect society and constitutional guarantees, such as the right to own
property and free speech. A few, however, advocated freedom of religion; indeed,
opposition to that particular liberal measure united an otherwise divided society. 25
However, the divergent views of the proper relationship between state and society
turned constitutional debates into ideological and civil wars.
On one end of the political spectrum, “liberals” aspired to a democratic federal
republic, with strong restrictions on the executive power. They favored an open trade
policy and insisted on the reduction of rights granted to corporate groups such as the
church and the army. On the other side, “conservatives” or authoritarians claimed that
Peru lacked the cultural and structural development - namely, homogeneous cultural
groups, literate masses, and a communication network - necessary for the successful
functioning of federalism and democracy. They usually favored protectionist trade
policies. Since most preferred a constitutional monarchy, they settled for a strong

24
25

Aljovín, Caudillos y Constituciones, 73, 96, 102.
Ibid., 77-79, 112.

19

central government that would prevent the anarchy of partisan politics and believed that
a separation of powers and a free press would successfully counterbalance the
executive. 26
Still, most liberals and conservatives differentiated between active and passive
citizenship stipulating the necessity of literacy and property requirements for voting
privileges and office-holding, measures that would impede the participation of the lower
classes in politics. In other words, they understood equality before the law - or civil
equality - as separate from political equality. 27 They shared a negative vision of the
Indians based on their reliance on a subsistence economy and their “wasteful” ways
during their several festivities throughout the year. Defining them as backward, lazy,
stupid, and superstitious people, criollos deemed necessary the intervention of the State
to turn Indians into productive citizens. Although liberals had more faith in the
possibilities of civilizing the Indians through educational reforms and their insertion
into the market economy, neither the liberal nor the conservative political platform
incorporated the majority of the population as active political agents. 28
By mid 1822 severe economic, administrative, and military problems forced San
Martín to seek Simón Bolivar’s cooperation. After his unsuccessful interview with the
Liberator of the north, San Martín convened the first Peruvian constitutional congress
on September 20, 1822, renounced his powers, and sailed for Europe. 29 The electoral
law stipulated that each of the nine departamentos -administrative units - should elect a
number of representatives based on its population. Since four departamentos remained

26

Pike, Modern, 53; Aljovín, Caudillos y Constituciones, 97-99, 101, 105.
Aljovín, Caudillos y Constituciones, 118-19.
28
Walker, Smoldering Ashes, 124, 155-56, 196, 199.
29
Lynch, Spanish American, 184-187; Anna, Royal Government, 210-211, 193, 204-5; Pike, Modern, 52.
27

20

in royalist hands, their representatives were elected among the citizens born in those
regions living in Lima. All male citizens over twenty-one could vote, including Indians,
although they could not be elected. Despite the apparent openness of the political
system, a restricted group of urban criollos and mestizos controlled the electoral
process. Several irregularities reported by contemporaries stand out, such as the case of
a man who took eight or nine Indians from an open market to vote for him, becoming
one of the three representatives from the departamento of Huancavelica. 30
In congress, mostly composed of liberal clerics and lawyers, the ideological
cleavage was obvious. Electing three of its members to form an executive junta to direct
the war, the delegates turned to the task of drafting the country’s first constitution. The
military campaign directed by the Junta was a complete disaster and it was feared the
viceroy would retake Lima. In February 1823 a group of officers headed by General of
the Peruvian Army, Andrés de Santa Cruz, former royalist, forced congress to elect the
aristocratic militia colonel and ardent separatist José de la Riva Agüero y Sánchez
Boquete as the first president of Peru. 31
These officers believed that the new republic needed a strong executive who
could take secret and timely decisions during turbulent times instead of relying on a
slow, indecisive legislative. With this bloodless coup, the y bestowed upon the army a
responsibility that reached beyond the military sphere. In the document by which these
officers requested that congress elect Riva Agüero as president, they argued that the
Junta had never gained the confidence of the population or that of the army. In addition
to that document, a similar letter arrived from the militia garrisoned outside Lima, along
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with one signed by several citizens criticizing the activities of congress. The coup and a
more authoritarian form of government thus rested, or so its creators maintained, on the
newly introduced notions of public opinion and popular sovereignty - employed,
however, in a context of direct democracy. 32
The Peruvian officer corps, which originated mainly out of defectors from the
realist army and militia, was composed of criollos and mestizos convinced that Peru and
they themselves would do better outside the control and restraints of Spain. Many
higher officers had received land as rewards for military services and joined the criollo
aristocracy in wanting political power to shape the new state according to their vision of
what was best for the country and themselves. 33 The era of the caudillos had begun.
In June 1823 Spanish troops recaptured Lima briefly and congress took
advantage of the confusion to deposed Riva Agüero in favor of the Marquis of Torre
Tagle. Congress then looked upon Bolívar’s envoy, General Antonio José de Sucre, and
his Colombian troops for protection. Although military officers and politicians feared
Peru would loose its still feeble independence under Bolívar and his confederation
dreams, the situation seemingly left the legislators no other choice but to invite him to
assume supreme military and political authority. Bolívar did so in September 1823 as
congress suspended the ne wly promulgated liberal constitution. 34
In early 1824 unpaid Argentine and Chilean troops in Callao mutinied, giving
the fortress to the royalists who again took Lima while Bolívar la y sick north of the
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capital. Torre Ta gle, his ministers, many notable criollos, and three hundred officers of
the Peruvian army went to the royalist side. Many Peruvians had not signed the
Declaration of Independence willingly, but had been guided by instincts of selfpreservation, so the same principle made it easy for them to change camps. Among the
groups that willingly signed the Declaration were Peruvian-born nobles, criollo
professionals, nonwhites championing reforms, and some import-export merchants
advocating free trade. By 1824, the constant trade disruptions and demands for
contributions from the patriot government had bankrupt most of them, while not
bringing independence any closer – or so it seemed. 35
But Bolívar and his followers, including Peru’s future military caudillos, refus ed
to give up. Placing all civilian matters on the hands of one prominent criollo, Bolívar
concentrated on raising and training an army. The Peruvian navy controlling the Pacific
coast made possible the arrival of fresh Colombian reinforcements who were
incorporated into Bolívar’s multinational troops. Peruvians drafted from different
northern areas, sometimes even twelve- year old boys, drilled constantly as new
factories worked around the clock producing munitions by melting nails recovered from
dismantled furniture. Gold and silver items obtained from the churches along with
financial contributions imposed on the towns of the former intendancy of Trujillo
produced by April 1824 an army of 8000 paid men and a sizeable great cavalry force. 36
The next month Bolívar crossed the Andes to reunite with Sucre’s troops, the
infantry unit under General José de la Mar (Ecuadorian), and the Army of the South
under Generals Andrés de Santa Cruz (Bolivian) and Agustín Gamarra (Peruvian).
35
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Meeting Spanish forces at Junín, the superior patriot cavalry sent the royalist army
fleeing. Bolívar then moved toward Lima, entrusting Sucre with the Army of
Liberation. On December 8, 1824 the battle of Ayacucho defined Peru as an
independent country. 37
Peru emerged from the long war of independence with a prostrate economy and
a growing foreign debt. The loans contracted in the British stock market bought war
materiel but did not revive the economy. The small internal market, the lack of ships,
unavailability of capital, and disseminated labor force provided little incentive for
investment in manufacturing. The high protective tariffs imposed by the commercial
code of 1826 had, in reality, little national industry to protect. The weakness of the
State, moreover, impeded the collectio n of such duties, thus encouraging corruption and
contraband, which in turn undermined the protective and revenue functions of the
tariffs. The new Peruvian oligarchy - including several high ranking military officers contented itself with governmental positions and land, as the hacienda, utilizing
inefficient and outmoded pre-capitalist ways of production but controlling people and
territory, became the center of social, economic, and political power. 38
The Bolivarian Constitution, calling for a centralized and authoritarian form of
government with a lifetime president, was promulgated in late 1826 as the first step in
the creation of the Confederation of the Andes. Many congressional and military leaders
despised the idea of a foreigner ruling Peru, especially one who had annexed Guayaquil
to the Gran Colombia (present Ecuador, Colombia, and Venezuela). Growing
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opposition in Peru and political turmoil in Gran Colombia convinced Bolívar to
abandon his confederation dreams as well as Lima.

39

The Constitution of Cádiz and the wars of independence brought into the
colonies a modern republican language and praxis, which transformed the sociopolitical panorama. However, these modern ideas coexisted with traditional
authoritarian and corporate values creating a political culture marked by contradiction.
For instance, the new Peruvian elite began the construction of a republican nation-state
that excluded the majority of the population from active political participation,
justifying their project with modern rational discourses. 40 No faction of the
ideologically divided Peruvian elite, uncommitted throughout the wars of independence
and fractionalized along regional lines, could establish itself as the new ruling class nor
support a State accepted by most as the legitimate successor of Spanish authority.
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CHAPTER 3. NINETEENTH-CENTURY CAUDILLISMO AND POLITICAL
CULTURE
Nineteenth-century Peruvian caudillismo, a political system based on the
leaders’ use of violence and patrimonial alliances to achieve power, had two great
periods: the first one evolved from the war of independence and the second one from
the War of the Pacific (1879-1883).1 During the first half of the century, economically
weak ideological and regional factions fought alongside military caudillos to impose
their view of the best organization for the new Republican State. By 1872, an
economically strong social group, mainly coastal in origin and linked by family and
business ties, established the Civilista Party, which successfully placed the first civilian
in the presidency. The civilista platform consisted of a liberal economic program and a
conservative political schema, settling the liberal-conservative debate. The War of the
Pacific and the Chilean occupation ruined Peru’s economy leaving a political vacuum.
With the civilistas debilitated, regional and ideological disputes ensued allowing a
group of military officers and civilians grouped in the Constitutional Party to control the
State. However, a coalition of the most influential civilian groups won the 1895 civil
war initiating a period of consecutive civilian governments, which shaped the
Republican Peruvian State during the twentieth century.
The ambiguity of criollos during the war of independence, their economic
weakness afterwards, the regional conflicts, and their ideological divergence impeded
the formation of a ruling class capable of replacing the king’s legitimacy with a
constitution. The emergent political culture exploited the confusing notions of reason
and popular sovereignty on the one hand, and popular sovereignty, public opinion, and
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representative government on the other. The republican language in Peru supported an
elitist, antidemocratic discourse and, at the same time, a logic of “direct democracy”
specifically during revolutions and counterrevolutions. 2
Popular sovereignty presumed equality of rights and obligations for all citizens
while proclaiming reason, i.e., the capacity to think in orderly rational ways, to be the
obvious propeller of a society towards social progress and peace. 3 Most of the Peruvian
population in the 1800s consisted of illiterate Indians and mestizos, the majority of
whom did not speak Spanish but some variation of Quechua or Aymara. Peruvian
Indians, with strong corporate values and engaging in subsistence economic activities,
could not identify with the criollo minority or the liberal values upholding individualism
and capitalism. The impossibility of allowing political sovereignty to reside in the
Indian masses appeared obvious to many liberal and conservative political leaders alike.
On the other hand, electoral processes marred by irregularities and violence
called into question the legitimacy of representative government, making its
relationship with popular sovereignty and public opinion problematic; thus, creating an
ambiguous notion of authority. Each contending faction claimed to represent public
opinion, possessor of political authority, against the abuses of the group in power, using
the notion of popular sovereignty as in a direct democracy to justify revolutions.
Accusing the faction in power of representing private interests rather than those of the
“nation” or of introducing chaos in pursue of their selfish aspirations, the revolutionary
groups argued that force became indispensable to defend the notions of popular
sovereignty, peace, and liberty - in other words, the spirit of the constitution. However,
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the superimposition of the egalitarian republican notion over Peruvian corporate and
hierarchical society eroded the possibility of developing democratic political discourses,
which created a gap between the theoretical principles of government and the country’s
reality. Consequently, the idea of “nation,” “the people,” and “patria” did not involve a
community of equal individuals, but incorporated, asymmetrical, different social
groups. 4
Politicians and caudillos easily justified their participation in civil wars through
the manipulation of the new republican language. Most Peruvian constitutions entrusted
the armed forces with the protection of the political system and the maintena nce of
internal order. Besides, liberal constitutions, such as the first one in 1823, attempted to
protect the individual from an abusive government by declaring that any governmental
infraction against individual rights would break the social contract and justify popular
resistance to oppression. Consequently, military officers could appeal to the constitution
to justify their political interventions. 5
In addition, Peruvian constitutions provided for a state of emergency, or regimes
of exception, “a legal and political order for times of crisis” such as natural disasters,
rebellion, subversion, and war. During such periods, guarantees and liberties could be
suspended. In fact, the war of independence inaugurated these temporary dictatorships
when San Martín and Bolívar established them out of “the rule of necessity” or to
protect the “public welfare.” Interpreting the constitutional provisions for regimes of
exception within a “direct democracy” logic and claiming faithful compliance with their
constitutional mandate to defend the republic, caudillo-presidents resorted to
4
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authoritarian measures without congressional approval while caudillos organized
revolutions and counterrevolutions. 6
Although the constitution of 1828 declared that “the public force is obedient and
cannot deliberate,”7 and the 1839 constitution stated that any attempts to legitimize
revolutions by claiming to represent the “sovereign people” would be considered a
criminal attack on “public security,” the interpretation of who represented the sovereign
people inevitably lay with the triumphant caudillo. 8 In this way, Peruvian constitutions,
employing two competing set of principles, liberal and authoritarian, symbolized the
contradictory Peruvian political culture.
Revolutions using the “d irect democracy logic” followed these steps: first,
caudillos justified their coup by accusing the group in power of threatening the nation’s
interests; second ly, they declared the nation’s legitimate right to intervene through
insurrection; thirdly, they claimed to represent public opinion, bearer of political
sovereignty, during the national emergency; and finally, the caudillos arranged for
elections to ratify the revolutionary actions and change their revolutionary status into a
constitutional one. 9
Nineteenth-century revolutionaries saw themselves as saviors of the patria and
did not escape the constitutional discourse in which political legitimacy derived from a
representative government. Thus, each revolutionary group hoped that its violent acts
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would inaugurate a legal and legitimate regime, based on a constitution representing the
“spirit of the country,” and ending the political instability and the constant civil wars. 10
A broad sense of social responsibility towards the country alongside desires for
personal glory and power, as well as different concepts of what was best for the
country, encouraged military officers to participate in politics. 11 The lack of a civilian
group committed to independence turned the officer corps that supported San Martín
and then Bolívar into the founding fathers of the Republic. The officer class saw itself
as part of the only national institution incorporating all the different social sectors and
presenting the perfect combination of tradition and modernity. The military’s sense of
hierarchy and order coexisted harmoniously with the modern notion of equality, since
every man was equal to those within his rank, leader to those below him, and obedient
to his superiors. In this way, military officers stood as a source of order and stability
with commitments that went beyond external defense to include an internal mission as
well; the military man was called to protect the fatherland from anarchy. 12
Such a sense of responsibility, however, did not preclude the flourishing of
personal aspirations and interests since the army became an effective agent of
mobilization for ambitious officers and soldiers from both upper and lower classes.
Civilian factional leaders encouraged military intervention in politics because they
lacked the force to gain access to, and remain in power. The possibility of a soldiers’
coup against their officer made the politicization of the troops important. 13
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The political vacuum and crisis of legitimacy following the war of independence
encouraged unregulated political competition transforming violence into an essential
part of politics, which nurtured caudillismo and the formation of a hybrid state utilizing
modern bureaucratic and traditional patrimonial practices. 14
After independence, San Martín divided the country into departamentos, which
in turn were subdivided into provinces, following the intendancy jurisdictions of the
colonial era. Prefects and subprefects replaced the intendants and subdelegates. Political
instability, constant border wars, and the economic weakness of the State promoted a
high level of regional autonomy. The control of the State by a contending faction
depended on the construction and maintenance of alliances that could provide capital,
men, supply, and “popular support” during revolts and civil wars. Consequently,
prefects, who led the departamentos and the resources, became key political players. 15
Presidents appointed prefects who, in turn, appointed subprefects and the leaders
of the militias as established by law. In the early republic, most prefects were military
men since they needed to protect the region from internal disorder –or the oppositionand possible external invasions. These posts were given as rewards to loyal followers
who could raise a political and military support base in the region. For example, Bolívar
appointed Cuzco-born General Agustín Gamarra as the first prefect of Cuzco.
Subprefects oversaw the tax collection, producing roughly 40 percent of the State’s
revenue and a higher percentage of provincial income. They also recruited soldiers,
provided supplies in times of war, and circulated information while checking upon
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political opponents. Militia leaders recruited and trained men while donating uniforms,
horses, and arms. 16
Prefect, subprefect, and militia officer positions carried several benefits. Prefects
wielded extensive influence because of their control of resources and could bargain with
national caudillos on favorable terms or become a caudillo themselves. Subprefects had
access to substantial amounts of capital yielded by the tax collection, which could be
invested or loaned out for interest before payment was made to higher administrative
levels. Militia leaders encountered various open avenues for local power, financial
opportunities, and even commissions in the regular army. 17
Most of the military caudillos who ruled the country in the first half of the
century had held a prefecture. Caudillos organized multiclass alliances linking the rural
population with national political ideologies and events. Caudillos coexisted alongside
governmental institutions, manipulating them but without completely controlling them.
Their power, based on shifting alliances and in constant dialogue with different sectors
of society, suffered constant challenges keeping the states they built extremely
vulnerable. 18
In this way, the State functioned through modern, rational, bureaucratic
practices established by the constitution, but at the same time through traditional
patrimonial ways, as in the selection of regional authorities, who performed roles
established by the constitution and others emanating from caudillismo. Moreover, the
constant elaboration of new constitutions in the early republic - 1823, 1826, 1828, 1834,
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1836, 1839 - that strengthened or weakened the executive branch, establishing a
decentralized or centralized political administration, discouraged profound
administrative reforms.
Relations between the republican State and the native population clearly showed
the coexistence of modern and traditional institutions. In 1825, Bolívar tried to
transform communal Indian peasants into independent farmers by distributing
communal lands. This liberal decree intended to assimilate the masses of Indians into
the market economy and a criollo national society. 19 However, Indian communities
successfully resisted the liberal “attack” due to the economic weakness of the State
during the first half of the nineteenth century as well as their ability to insert themselves
into caudillo politics. The Indian head tax, abolished and reinstated by Bolívar within a
year, represented a huge percentage of State income while the leaders of Indian
communities kept linking the payment of tribute to communal land rights as in colonial
times. Tribute payment gave communal Indians certain assurances that their land would
not be divided or lost to outsiders since regional authorities understood that the Indians’
ability to pay depended on their landed status. Thus, the maintenance of the colonial
Indian head tax, crucial to the sustenance of the State and caudillo wars, gave Indians
room for negotiation. However, at the same time, it kept alive perceptions of the social
value of the native population dating back to colonial times. Criollos continued to
describe Indians as lazy, drunk, and superstitious people who needed the intervention of
the State to force them into the market and productive activities. Consequently, Indians
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were not included within the politicians or caudillos’ political platforms as active
citizens. 20
Liberal and conservative political practices differed little. Both groups
conspired, relied on force and caudillos to control the State, and used republican notions
in a “direct democracy” sense. Once in power, both groups tried to exclude the
opposition from participating in the conduct of national affairs by favoring their
followers and exiling their political enemies. 21 The liberal and conservative maneuvers
through or against the caudillos Generals Agustín Gamarra, Manuel Ignacio de
Vivanco, and Ramón Castilla serve as examples.
Agustín Gamarra joined the royal army in 1809, fighting the rebels of Río de la
Plata, Upper Peru, and Peru. However, after a change of heart in early January 1821,
San Martín placed Gamarra, the mestizo and then army colonel who was from Cuzco
and spoke Quechua, in charge of a battalion departing for the Central Andes. Despite
Gamarra’s unimpressive military abilities, he participated in the Battles of Junín and
Ayacucho, which sealed Peru’s independence. Bolívar promoted him to general and
appointed him to the Cuzco’s prefecture in late 1824. As prefect, Gamarra utilized an
authoritarian platform promising Cuzco its return to prominence. Although he could not
establish complete local control because of liberal opposition, Gamarra astutely
established a network of alliances in the region through his selection of subprefects and
militia officers that enabled him not only to reach the presidency, but to become the first
chief executive to complete his term on office. 22
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In 1829, a territorial dispute plunged Peru and Gran Colombia into war. Despite
Peruvian control of the sea, land reverses stabilized the war. Peru’s weak economy
suffered and support for the war and President La Mar, elected by the liberal-dominated
congress, dissipated. 23
Gamarra dreamed of incorporating Bolivia into Peru and in 1828, while still
prefect of Cuzco, he had invaded Bolivia during a time of political turmoil in that
country, installing a Peruvian sympathizer as ruler. Gamarra had acted independently of
President La Mar, a reflection of the weakness of the State in the early republic. When
war broke out with Colombia the next year, Gamarra allied himself with the prefect of
Arequipa, General Antonio Gutiérrez de la Fuente, to rid Peru of the weak La Mar.
Gamarra accused the president, born in Cuenca, Ecuador, part of the Peruvian
viceroyalty during the early 1800s, of forcing the country into a disastrous war due to
his personal ambition of reuniting southern Ecuador with northern Peru. Thus, Gamarra
accused La Mar precisely of what he himself desired for the south. 24
As La Fuente took charge of the government in Lima, Gamarra, also in charge
of the Southern Army, enlisted the support of several military officers to force La Mar
to resign his command and the presidency in June 1829. Gamarra and La Fuente
justified the coup by invoking the right of the officer corps –or part of it- to represent
public opinion in the execution of “necessary” actions to save the fatherland. Thus,
military officers assigned to the army, a microcosm of Peru, and its officers a broad
responsibility towards the patria. Thus, La Fuente took control of the State in the name
of a “moribund nation” after listening to the “voices of the nation and the army.” In his
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message to the newly installed congress the next month, La Fuente stated that his
“mission had proceeded from an origin as pure and noble [as that of congress]: the
public call, the national sentiment that pronounced itself for the salvation of the
fatherland.”25
Gamarra won the first popular indirect election of 1829, as established by the
liberal constitution of 1828, becoming a constitutional president. Since congress waived
the literacy requirement for voting, all adult males, including Indians, cast ballots. To
resist the several revolts against his administration from domestic opponents and from
the Bolivian president, Andrés de Santa Cruz, who wished to incorporate at least
southern Peru to Bolivia, Gamarra resorted to caudillismo and patrimonialism. 26 In light
of the weakness of the State, he strengthened Peruvian patrimonial tendencies. During
revolts and civil wars, military strength depended on regular and militia units, as well as
montoneras. Loyal military officers enjoyed promotions and rewards, while officers
opposing him ran the risk of losing their commissions. 27 Militia officers gained access
to army commissions or business opportunities since most militia commanders were
also businessmen providing uniforms and arms to their units. Gamarra also rewarded
loyal officers with prefectures, according them a great deal of autonomy in exchange for
their support. Cuzqueño Indian communities received tax cuts in return for their
military services in montoneras. As a result, the state Gamarra built did not fortify
republican institutions and weakened the foundations of military discipline, encouraging
the politicization and factionalism of the officer corps. 28
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Most conservatives supported Gamarra’s authoritarianism without being
necessarily gamarristas. Several periodicals in cities such as Lima, Cuzco, and
Ayacucho defended the effectiveness of a strong executive. The editors, voicing their
doubts about the efficacy of congress, claimed that the maintenance of order should
supersede the importance of individual liberties. Conservatives such as José María de
Pando and Colonel Manuel Ignacio de Vivanco argued that an authoritarian political
system with an “aristocracy of knowledge” ruling the country suited Peruvian reality,
whereas the liberal theories were utopian. 29
During his administration, Gamarra could not invade Bolivia because of
opposition from a liberal congress. However, Bolivian president Santa Cruz ruled the
Peru-Bolivia Confederation from 1836 to 1839. After the chaotic events defeating the
Confederation, Gamarra ruled the country fo r a second time until his death in late 1841
while invading Bolivian territory. 30 During Gamarra’s second administration the
conservative constitution of 1839 replaced the 1836 confederate constitution. It
reinforced the executive power by extending the presidential term to six years.
Presidents could not be impeached for breaches of the constitution, a situation that
Gamarra faced during his first administration, unless they attacked the independence or
integrity of the country. The new constitution also suppressed the regional
administrative organisms created by the 1828 constitution. The electoral law of 1839
maintained the indirect system and established both income and literacy requirements
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for voting, although it waived them until 1844 for Indians and mestizos. The law also
set a minimum income for aspiring presidents and congressional representatives. 31
The constitution of 1839, however, did not appear sufficiently conservative to
some conservative groups. Colonel Manuel Ignacio de Vivanco, prefect of Arequipa,
revolted in 1841 and, after attaining the rank of general, again in 1843 claiming the
necessity of an even stronger executive. 32 Successful the second time, Vivanco, an
aristocrat and intellectual, became Peru’s “Supreme Director.” In February 1843, the
“people” of Arequipa issued a public manifest calling for him to take charge of the
government. The General replied, “Honor, patriotism, and responsibility forced me to
listen to the population . . . I, Peruvians, will forget my personal goals to obey your
commands.” The Director closed congress, claiming it necessary to reduce disorder and
disunity arising from “personal ambitions” of the legislators - that is, liberals opposing
his authoritarianism. He wanted to establish, said Vivanco, the rule of a young,
educated, and moral elite. 33
Despite Gamarra’s conservatism, he tended to appoint moderate politicians
rather than extreme conservatives. Military caudillos often mediated between extreme
liberals and conservatives, who tried to remove all members of the opposition from
governmental positions. General Ramón Castilla represents the best example. 34
Ramón Castilla, a mestizo from the southern region of Tarapacá, remained a
royalist officer until 1822 when he joined San Martín, organizing the cavalry that
delivered victory at the Battle of Junín. In 1834, Castilla became prefect of Puno.
31
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During the Peru-Bolivia Confederation, he escaped to Chile and joined Gamarra’s effort
to expel Santa Cruz from Peru. Castilla defeated Vivanco’s authoritarian model in 1844
with liberal support, acquiring the surname “Soldier of the Law” and the presidency in
1845.35 Although Castilla fought alongside liberals against extreme conservative
groups, he employed authoritarian and conciliatory measures toward his political and
personal enemies to remain in power, becoming the second president to complete his
term in office. Even though Castilla claimed to respect the constitution, on occasion he
broke the law, rationalizing his actions as necessary to preserve the most vital national
interest of internal order. 36
Castilla and his liberal allies utilized republican notions within a logic of direct
democracy to justify their revolutions. However, like Vivanco’s group, radical liberals
attempted to rid the government of any political opponents whereas Castilla recognized
the necessity of incorporating the political opposition in the running of the country as a
way to stop them from plotting constantly, a disagreement that soured Castilla’s alliance
with the liberals. 37
When General José Rufino Echenique succeeded Castilla, it marked the first
peaceful succession in Peruvian history. In late 1853, however, tensions between Peru
and Bolivia grew as embezzlement accusations shook the Echenique administration and
the president himself. Sensing the moment ripe for revolution, Vivanco’s followers in
Arequipa revolted in January 1854, arguing that the corrupt central government did not
listen to the popular demand to avenge Bolivian insults. Taking advantage of Vivanco’s
exile in Chile, Castilla shaped the Arequipa movement along liberal ideals, supervising,
35
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for example, the abolition of slavery and the Indian head tax during the civil war. Early
in 1855, Castilla defeated Echenique’s forces near the capital and established a
provisional government. His liberal ministers suspended the citizenship status of all
governmental officials and military officers who had not aided the “popular cause” and
removed them from their jobs. The new government then issued a decree, as Gamarra
had after defeating Santa Cruz and the Confederation, denying pensions to the
dependents of military personnel who had died defending the constitutional government
of Echenique. 38
Castilla’s appointment of moderate liberal and conservative ministers created a
schism between the executive and the triumphant radical liberals. Serious disagreements
arose over the necessity of replacing the Indian head tax with a “personal contribution”
by every male over twenty-one years of age and the Amnesty Law pardoning most
officials and officers who had fought on Echenique’s side. Meanwhile, congress
promulgated the liberal constitution of 1856, which reinstated regional governments,
annulled the private military and ecclesiastical fueros, and reduced the presidential term
to four years. Although it canceled the electoral colleges, thus establishing direct
elections, the vote remained restricted to the literate, those owning a workshop, or
military personnel. Moreover, the constitution declared that congress would determine
the size of the armed forces and approve the promotions from mayors up. It also
proclaimed that the duty of the armed forces was to protect the constitution and not an
arbitrary or despotic executive. 39 Castilla protested civilian meddling in military affairs,
arguing tha t members of the armed forces owed obedience to military regulations, a
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stance that worsened his relations with the liberal congress. In November 1856,
Vivanco revolted again from Arequipa. In the midst of the civil war, congress decreed
that as soon as the government pacified the country, the provisional president should
call for general elections. According to the new constitution, no one occupying the
presidency could present his candidacy. In this way, the liberals attempted to rid
themselves of Castilla. As Castilla fought Vivanco’s forces in the south, Lieutenant
Colonel Pablo Arguedas dissolved ongress, arguing that Peru’s fate depended on
Castilla’s control of the State. Arguedas insisted that, after listening to the “nation,” he
had “sacrificed” himself and used the army to act on behalf of the people. Although
Castilla boasted that congress and the constitution could have been reformed peacefully,
he conveniently accepted Arguedas’ actions as a fait accompli. A new congress
promulgated the moderate constitution of 1860, which kept the four-year presidential
term, reinstated the indirect vote for males over twenty-one years of age who were
literate, owned property, or paid taxes. Congressional authority over military
promotions could involve only gene rals and the armed forces owed obedience to
military laws and regulations. The appointment of prefects and subprefects remained the
president’s prerogative. After defeating Vivanco in 1858, Castilla won the presidential
elections. 40
After mid-century, the characteristics that had defined the early republic
changed. As the central State reduced its dependency on the Indian head tax due to the
boom in guano production, a structured civilian group with its own ideology surfaced.
Guano, an agricultural fertilizer rich in phosphates had accumulated for decades on
Peruvian isles, acquired notoriety in Europe during the 1840s. Foreign commercial
40
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firms exported the product in consignment due to the absence of national capitals and
the government’s lack of funds. These consignees paid the costs of collecting,
transporting, and marketing the guano, sharing the net profits with the Peruvian
government. The substantial and steady guano profits had several consequences:
increased State centralization, the preeminence of Lima, the birth of a strong new
civilian group, a worsening of Indian conditions, and, paradoxically, the bankruptcy of
the state. 41
The guano profits reduced the central government’s dependence on the Indian
head tax, allowing for more centralization and less negotiation with regional interests.
The abolition of the tax in 1854 during the liberal revolt against Echenique reduced
local governments to economic dependency upon the Lima bureaucracy. The
suppression of the tribute, coupled with the abolition of the curaca office –Indian chief-,
undermined the communities’ ability to negotiate with local authorities when Indian
communal lands became under attack during the second half of the century. 42
The first administration of Castilla initiated the consolidation of the internal
debt, which included loans and damages incurred by private interests during the war of
independence or civil wars up to 1845, as a way to encourage the formation of national
capital. The vagueness of the consolidation laws resulted in illegitimate claims for
millions during the Echenique administration as well as the collection of promissory
notes by a few powerful individuals. 43
The consolidation of the internal debt and the manumission of slaves, decreed
during the liberal revolution of 1854, resulted in compensatory payment to slave
41
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owners, which created a moneyed class and strengthened the financial position of many
existing groups. By the early 1860s, the families who benefited from government
payments had become important investors in guano and coastal plantations of cotton
and sugar. In 1860, congress enacted an earlier congressional resolution declaring the
preference of Peruvian citizens as consignees, so new contracts replaced the old ones
although Peruvians usually had foreign partners. The Compañía Nacional de
Consignación, led by Manuel Pardo y Lavalle, took the English market in 1862. The
newly formed plutocracy, coastal and Limeñian in origin, with interests in guano and
agricultural exportation, also replaced the foreign cons ignees as the government’s
financier, participating in the opening of national banks by 1863. This plutocracy,
linked by family and business ties, imposed the primacy of Lima over the northern and
southern regions. 44
The elections of 1871 were significant because they saw the formation of the
Sociedad Independencia Electoral, eventually labeled the Civilista Party. The party,
formed by distinguished civilians and military officers, represented the merger of the
old aristocracy and the new capitalists, and supported the candidacy of the ex-consignee
Manuel Pardo y Lavalle to the presidency. 45 The Civilista Party, relying on a complex
national organization and modern campaign techniques, overcame the liberalconservative political dichotomy by formulating a moderate, practical program of
national development that favored an agro-export economy, the supremacy of the coast
and Lima, firm rule by the talented, a paternalistic view of the Indian population, and a
small, professional army under civilian control. Civilistas differed from the liberals in
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their lack of obsession with such things as weakening executive powers, the extreme
monitoring of the army by congress, and the supreme importance of individual
guarantees. Pardo counted on vast popular support in Lima and other cities due to his
1868 work as president of the Charity Society and his 1869 performance as ma yor of
the capital. He also visited Lima’s poorer neighborhoods and traveled outside the
capital delivering speeches. He enjoyed also the support of the consignees, bankers, and
merchants, as well as the majority of the capital’s university youth and professors. The
Civilista party represented in 1871 the young, the bright, the rich, and the poor; it was a
new alternative to militarism and the old politicians. 46
The war of independence and the country’s acephalous condition thereafter gave
rise to the first militaristic moment, which died with its maximum representative,
Castilla. By 1871, most of the heroes of the war of independence had disappeared and a
new civilian group had emerged to control the State. The failed revolt by the Secretary
of Defense, Colonel Gutiérrez, who asserted the necessity to defend the armed forces
and the patria from an antimilitaristic civilian, had counted neither with popular support
nor the backing of significant elements of the military. 47
In 1872, Pardo became the first civilian president of republican Peru. He
endured several revolts and assassination attempts from conservatives, from Nicolás de
Piérola and the southern interests, from Iglesias and the northern interests, and from
some elements of the military. Pardo reduced the size of the military, leaving many
former officers and soldiers unemployed. In addition, he launched a program of
professionalization that reduced the possibility of enlisted men’s becoming officers
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without attending a military school while others saw their personal interests or those of
the patria in danger if the armed forces withdraw from the political arena. Nevertheless,
several military officers supported Pardo’s attempt to professionalize the officer corps
and the noncommissioned officers, defending his regime against the constant
uprisings. 48
Despite the guano profits, the State remained unable to balance the national
budget. The lack of an effective tax system, the constant internal wars, the debt burden,
and a war with Spain in 1866 bankrupted the State, forcing different administrations to
ask the guano consignees constantly for cash advances against future profits. During the
civilista administration, the economic situation worsened leaving the party without
realistic possibilities for the next presidential elections. Instead of placing itself in the
opposition, the party decided to support a viable government while aiming for
dominance in congress and other organizations. In 1876, General Mariano Ignacio
Prado succeeded Pardo. As the economic conditions worsened, the War of the Pacific
erupted. 49
The devastation brought on by the war and the imprisonment of the civilistas
and other prominent leaders created a political vacuum, fueling regional disputes that
were reminiscent of the war of independence. However, the second militaristic moment
of the nineteenth century sprang from defeat rather than victory. The republican State
had relied upon a succession of makeshift coalitions that had fostered political
instability and socio-economic backwardness. The relative pacification and
centralization achieved by Castilla in the 1850s and 1860s reduced the number of costly
48
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civil wars but did not eliminate the constant conspiracies and revolts or the necessity to
establish regional alliances with prefects and military commanders.
By 1879 Bolivia and Chile had long-standing boundary disputes. In addition, the
coasts of Bolivia were rich in saltpeter, business in which Chilean capital was
prominent. Peruvian interest in this conflict, besides upholding the principle of peaceful
settlement of disputes, was very specific: protect Peru’s territorial integrity against
Chilean intrigue. Chile had tried to bribe Bolivia with the southern Peruvian territories
in exchange for relinquishing most of the Bolivian coast to Chile. Bolivia had no navy
and Peru feared a Bolivian-Chilean attack if no other option was there for Bolivia. In
this light, Manuel Pardo had signed a secret alliance with Bolivia in 1873. 50
In February 1879, Chile invaded Bolivia provoking a declaration of war by La
Paz. Chile demanded Peruvian neutrality and declared war in April when Lima balked.
The lack of external credit and the state of war impeded the acquisition of armaments
and vessels. During the civilista administration, congress had approved a credit of four
millions for the construction of two armored ships in order to maintain naval parity with
Chile, but the financial crisis prevented implementation of the plan. 51 The naval
campaign lasted from April to October 1879, with Peru using over twenty-year-old
vessels. In November, the land campaigns started with the Chilean disembark in
Peruvian territory. The southern campaigns, Tarapacá and Tacna, concluded in 1880
with the destruction of most of the regular army and the disintegration of the BolivianPeruvian combined front. Politically, both Bolivia and Peru changed leaders during
these campaigns. Nicolás de Piérola became the Peruvian dictator after General Prado
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left the country in secrecy to proceed with armament dealings in Europe while a popular
uprising elevated General Narciso Campero to the Bolivian presidency. 52
In April 1880, the land campaign of Lima started with the blockade and
bombardment of the port of Callao. Several bombardments along the central and
northern coasts occurred since September. The Peruvian survivors of the southern
campaigns joined the inexperienced units formed in Lima, which lacked weapons,
transportation, and provisions. By January 1881, the Chilean army had captured Lima
and Piérola escaped to the highlands to organize the resistance. 53
When Chile refused to deal with the Dictator, a group of Limeñian notables
established a provisional government. As Piérola lost support, he left the country for
Europe trying to avoid a civil war. However, Chile deported the provisional president
due to his attempts to negotiate a contract that would allow Peru to offer Chile an
economic retribution instead of territorial yie lding. 54 Meanwhile, General Andrés
Avelino Cáceres started a fierce guerrilla resistance against the Chileans in the central
highlands. Cáceres had supported Castilla during the 1854 revolution, fought in the
1866 War against Spain, and stopped a sergeants’ revolt against Pardo in 1874. When
the War of the Pacific broke out, Cáceres, who participated in every campaign, was a
colonel and prefect of Cuzco. Between 1882 and 1883, Chilean authorities tried
unsuccessfully to capture Cáceres, known as the Brujo de los Andes (Andean Wizard),
who gave hope to many Peruvians that a counterattack remained a possibility. 55
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However, the northern hacendado, General Miguel Iglesias, who received his
commission as colonel from Piérola after raising a military unit, considered peace at any
cost to be indispensable to national reconstruction. Consequently, Iglesias in 1882
convoked a northern congress, which elected him “Regenerator.” Chile recognized and
supported Iglesias, who consolidated his dominion in the north after Chilean troops
defeated Cáceres’ montoneras in July 1883. Iglesias signed the Treaty of Ancón,
permanently ceding the southern province of Tarapacá, rich in saltpeter, to Chile and
accepting the temporary cession of the provinces of Tacna and Arica. 56
Cáceres, who considered Iglesias a Chilean puppet, emerged as the greatest
living hero of the war. In 1885, The Wizard defeated the iglesistas troops in the central
highlands and entered Lima with general popular support. Iglesias left the government
in hands of a provisional cabinet, which convoked general elections in 1886. Cáceres
won the elections, but he did not participate in politics as Gamarra or Castilla had. On
the one hand, Cáceres organized the Constitutional Party, conformed by civilians and
military personnel. 57 On the other, he attempted the transformation of the officer corps
into a political pressure group.
Like Gamarra, Cáceres tried to control the army to solidify his power, but he
maneuvered for an ideological control in addition to patrimonial practices. The Wizard
wanted an effective army; thus, he reopened the military school for cadets and the
center for noncommissioned officers established by Pardo before the war. 58 Cáceres,
however, also wanted an ideologically homogeneous officer corps. The
professionalization process that Cáceres envisioned would not stop military officers
56
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from participating in politics; it would stop them from caudillista practices. With an
officer corps united under an independent ideology, an officer would never again lead
his troops against another in support of partisan civilian political pursuits. The post-war
officer corps should become a pressure group and its members should participate in
politics through institutional channels, such as political parties. To accomplish these
goals, Cáceres created the Constitutional party while his vice-president, Colonel
Remigio Morales Bermúdez, presided over the Centro Militar y Naval founded in early
1888.59 Cáceres’ reconstruction project relied on authoritarian practices and the
strengthening of the armed forces, always maintaining the constitutional façade. The
war had witness the patriotism and heroism of soldiers and sailors; thus, several officers
claimed for the military institution role of spearhead in the regeneration of the country.
Cáceres and his entourage summed up the republican political culture and the military
experience of the nineteenth century; they embodied the essence of the Peruvian
military mind.
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CHAPTER 4. THE MILITARY MIND
Whereas Peruvian defeat in the War of the Pacific set the stage for the beginning
of the second militaristic moment of the nineteenth century, the war’s greatest living
hero took the leading role. Cáceres embodied military thought fashioned by the
nineteenth-century political culture and caudillista experience. Like Bolívar and
Castilla, Cáceres believed that republican and liberal institutions in Peru could flourish
only within an authoritarian political system. Ironically, liberty needed the protection of
an authoritarian executive capable of bending the law when necessary. Unlike any other
caudillo, Cáceres had absorbed the lessons from the civilista experience of the 1870s
and the War of the Pacific.
Throughout the 1880s, scholars, politicians, military men, and citizens in general
attempted to understand what had made possible Chile’s swift victory. Fingers pointed
to Peru’s republican history, that is, the lack of nation cohesion and state-building. The
behavior of the oppressed social sectors during the war particularly impressed
politicians and military officers. Several Indian communities refused the payment of
forced contributions established by Chilean authorities arguing that they did not form
part of Peru. Chinese laborers, enduring semi-slavery conditions, and part of the black
population engaged in the destruction of property. 1 Some civilian sectors blamed the
lack of national integration on the military and its constant involvement in civil wars,
while military officers condemned civilian partisan politics. Cáceres’ project for the
reconstruction and development of the patria required his party’s control of the state
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through a strong executive, the minimization of political opposition, and the support of
an expert, united, and disciplined military institution.
The Constitutional Party’s easy victory in the 1886 elections, a result of the
Wizard’s popularity, propelled Cáceres into the presidency. With the civilistas
impoverished and Piérola’s revolutions on hold, political opposition during Cáceres’
first term of office remained low. However, his administration did not shy away from
some “necessary” unconstitutional actions such as the replacement of some
uncooperative congressmen before their term of office was over. 2
In the 1890 elections, the Constitutional Party supported the candidacy of
Colonel Remigio Morales Bermúdez, Cáceres’ first vice-president, who had
participated in Castilla’s 1854 movement and Cáceres’ resistance in the War of the
Pacific. The civilistas, previously had supported the Constitutional party, but now
presented their own candidate. Piérola, backed by the Democratic Party, organized six
years earlier, and enjoying widespread popular support, represented a third option
between a Lima-centered oligarchy and a military one. Just before the elections,
Cáceres maneuvered to remove Piérola subjecting him to a military tribunal charged
with poor direction of the war. After a controversial congressional revision of the votes,
Morales Bermúdez assumed the presidency. 3
Morales Bermúdez’s administration also resorted to unconstitutional actions to
remain in power and ensure the Constitutional Party’s control of the state. In December
1890 a failed revolt led by Colonel Arturo Morales Toledo concluded with the summary
execution of twenty-two individuals. In the 1894, the chief executive closed several

2
3

Pike, Modern, 154.
Basadre, Historia, VIII, 1984, 2089-2093.

51

weekly newspapers opposed to the Cáceres candidacy for reelection and nullified
municipal elections because the Constitutional Party had lost control of them. “You
have sacrificed principles and laws, which are the soul of a nation, not to placate a god
but to please a man,” charged one congressional member against Morales Bermúdez. 4
Early in 1894, Morales Bermúdez became ill and died. Second vice-president, Colonel
Justiniano Borgoño, assumed the presidency, bypassing the civilian and pierolista first
vice-president who resigned in light of several high officials’ refusal to recognize him
as chief executive. In August, Cáceres initiated his second term of office. 5
In addition to strong civilista and pierolista opposition, Cáceres faced an
economic crisis in his second term, which forced the government to raise taxes, and
suffered diplomatic setbacks regarding Chile’s occupation of Tacna and Arica. All that,
combined with his increasing and obvious illegal actions towards the opposition
resulted in dwindling popular support. By late 1894, several revolts had exploded
throughout the country. The Civilista and Democratic parties formed the “National
Coalition,” which Piérola led in a bloody civil war against Cáceres and the regular
army. In March 1895, the Coalition’s army entered Lima to popular acclaim. During an
armistice to assist the wounded and bury the dead, Cáceres agreed to withdraw.
Although the regular army had not been defeated, he recognized the magnitude of the
popular opposition to his regime. A junta governed the country until September when
Nicolás de Piérola assumed the presidency. 6
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Cáceres believed, as Castilla did, in the necessity of a strong army to maintain
internal order. Like many officers since the war of independence, Cáceres attributed to
the army a broader role in society due to the weakness of republican institutions,
believing that “military virtue, resting essentially on a foundation of authority,
discipline, courage and occasional stubbornness, was adequate to solve the ills of
Peru.”7 After the War of the Pacific, it became urgent to consider national defense in
light of two complementary goals: the development of a modern nation-state and the
creation of a well- armed, professional military. Cáceres saw himself as the unselfish
patriot who could accomplish such goals with the support of the microcosm of society,
the army.
By the 1880s, the army was a professionalizing occupation attempting to
establish a jurisdiction, “a legitimate claim to apply its expertise to specific situations,”
albeit a broad one. 8 Since the early republic, several administrations had recognized the
need to transform the military vocation into a profession, requiring full- time, trained
officers and leaders who understood the rules and principles of the science of war. In
March 1823, Riva Agüero, imposed by the first Peruvian military coup, approved the
creation of the first military academy for cadets. The academy sought to end the custom
that an officer would initiate his career without any prior training. The resolution that
ordered its creation read,
The art of war is not only the result of valor as the masses consider erroneously. This
art is regulated by laws and principles that are theoretical as well as practical and need
to be studied. . . This is already well known in civilized nations, which trust their
national security only to officers who had started their careers with methodic study of
the military profession. 9
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Since Riva Agüero’s administration ended rapidly, this first academy never
functioned. Santa Cruz’ attempts to establish a technical school for the enlisted
personnel and a military academy for cadets while in charge of the government after
Bolívar’s departure in 1826 suffered a similar fate. In 1830, Gamarra ordered the
creation of a military academy for cadets that finally transcended the imagination of
national leaders. The decree read that in the academy the youth with a military calling
would “learn the principles and elements of the complicated science of war.” Cadets
already in the army, along with males between fifteen and eighteen years of age who
wished a commission, should attend the academy. However, because of political
instability, the academy in 1834 closed “temporarily” for fifteen years. 10
When Castilla assumed the presidency in 1845, the armed forces remained
regulated by the Spanish ordenanzas while cadets received from their unit officers
“some theoretical instruction directed toward practical uses.” Despite congressional and
military clamor for new regulations, the Military Code did not appear until 1865, but
even then revolution frustrated its application. In January 1950, the academy, renamed
Military Institute, opened its doors offering instruction for army and navy cadets. Each
cadet had to pass a Spanish test and provide all his needed utensils. The institute closed
temporarily due to the 1854 revolution, re-opening during 1859-1867.11
In 1872, the civilista Pardo re-opened the Military School, which began the
instruction of students between fourteen and seventeen years of age early next year. Its
1878 charter established a three-year program for infantry and cavalry officers and a
six-year program for artillery officers and those destined for the General Staff. Pardo
10
11
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also established the Escuela de Clases, which prepared young men between fourteen
and sixteen years of age as enlisted men; courses would last two or three-year
depending on the arm. Both institutions functioned until the War of the Pacific. Cáceres
re-opened the Escuela de Clases in 1888 and the Military School in 1890 until the
Coalitionist revolution of 1895. 12
As the military institution struggled to professionalize, it formally claimed a
broad jurisdiction after the War of the Pacific. Although the officer corps remained
politicized and fractionalized during the nineteenth century due to caudillismo and
patrimonial practices, army and navy officers shared a sense of broad military
responsibility toward the country. The constitutional mandate entrusting the armed
forces with the defense of the political system and the 1823 coup, which imposed Riva
Agüero as necessary to the national conduct of the war of independence, gave to the
armed forces an extra- military role in society. Whether patriotism, self- interest, or a
combination of the two guided those 1823 officers and the later caudillos to revolt
against constitutional or established authorities, by the 1880s military officers believed
their role included political actions in defense of the nation’s interests.
The lack of a civilian ruling class guiding the war of independence or
establishing a state afterwards and the politicians’ use of military leaders as caudillos
expanded the officers’ role. The weakness of civilian groups and institutions during the
early republic facilitated the political intervention of military officers who justified their
conduct in terms of national defense or military necessity, such as the 1823 coup.
Besides, the people expected military officers to lead revolutions to protect the
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“national” interest. Arequipa’s clamor for Vivanco in 1843 or Castilla’s support in 1854
served as examples.
The appointment of military men as prefects, which did not contradict the law,
also propelled officers outside a strictly military sphere. As the highest authority in the
departamentos, prefect-officers dealt with political, administrative, and developmental
activities. In addition, the administration of the country, based on the Napoleonic model
of organization, established a chain of command, that is, the lower official received his
orders from his superior. In this light, “the prefect depended on the President of the
Republic, the subprefect on the prefect, and the governor on the subprefect in a direct
hierarchical relation.”13 The country’s administrative structure, paralleling that of an
army, hinted, at least, at the appropriateness of military virtues in the conduction of
national affairs.
The weakness of civilian institutions and the liberal desire to “civilize” the
Indian masses through education induced congress in 1825 to order the functioning of
an elementary school in every unit of the army. Pardo’s Escuela de Clases, entrusted
with the training of the army’s enlisted personnel, was also responsible for the
instruction received by temporary recruits fulfilling their obligatory military service.
The Escuela provided the recruits with additional classes directed toward increasing
their work opportunities when returned to civilian life.14 During the first Cáceres
administration, the Ministry of War in 1888 ordered the establishment of elementary
and secondary schools in every army unit to ensure basic literacy and mathematical
skills, as well as teach basic geometry, Spanish grammar, Peruvian his tory, geography,
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and government along with target practice, notions of topography, and basic concepts of
fortification. 15 “Today, each garrison is a school, where the soldier learns not only his
duties toward the patria but to his family and God . . .,”the minister of war declared in
an awards ceremony at the Escuela in December 1888. “The crude and ignorant soldier
will be succeed by the citizen aware of his obligations; by the soldier, that useful
element in the defense of the nation, its rights and liberties, who will not be easily
dragged by sedition.”16
Military officers had expanded the armed forces’ role through the channels of
civilian approval or expectation of their involvement in politics, their actual
performance of extra- military duties, and through a legal channel by the constitution
entrusting the armed forces with the defense of the political system. The latter
mechanism had led officers to accept political appointments as prefects and now,
increasingly, it involved the establishment of military schools that performed the
function of civilian elementary and vocational training.
Although the officer class shared a broad sense of responsibility toward the
country, that is, they believed in the legitimacy of an expanded military role in society,
nineteenth-century officers had embraced different ideologies, usually fighting against
each other. Despite the officer class factionalism and the questionable promotion
process, army officers grasped their belonging to one national army. However true that
military officers raised militias and montoneras independently during revolutions, some
of which were incorporated into the regular army, generally, these units stood clearly as
something separate from, although complementary to, the regular forces. The remo val
15

Boletín Oficial El Peruano (Lima), 27 July 1888.
“Escuela de Clases para el Ejército” Revista Militar y Naval 22 (1 February 1889), 502-11. Italics in the
original.
16

57

of officers from the military roster after revolutions remained throughout the century as
temporary setbacks since new revolutions, personal reconciliation, or amnesty laws
reincorporated fallen officers. 17
Cáceres attempted the professionalization of the officer class by improving its
expertise, corporateness, and discipline. The unification of the officer class would result
from its acceptance of a military ideology that summarized the nineteenth century
military experience and posited a broad military jurisdiction. The Centro Militar del
Perú, systematized such ideology, disseminating it through its periodical, the Revista
Militar y Naval, and its members’ control of the military schools.
Established in 1888, the Centro, aggregated over 120 army and naval officers. 18
Its composition shows the connection of the Centro with Cáceres, his administrations,
and his party. Colonel Remigio Morales Bermúdez, president of the Centro in 1888 and
1889, was Cáceres vice-president from 1886 to 1890 winning the 1890 presidential
elections as the Constitutional party nominee. Colonel Justiniano Borgoño, first vicepresident of the Centro in 1888 and 1889, had fought under Cáceres during the
Wizard’s resistance campaign. Borgoño formed part of the Cáceres’ cabinet in 1886,
1887, and 1889 becoming Morales Bermúdez’ second vice-president in 1890. After
Morales’ death, prior to the 1894 presidential elections, Borgoño assumed the
presidency, maneuvering to get Cáceres elected for a second term. 19
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Colonel Rufino Torrico, second vice-president of the Centro in 1888,
participated in Cáceres’ 1886, 1887, and 1894 cabinets. 20 Navy Captain Manuel Melitón
Carvajal, treasurer of the Centro in 1888, its second vice-president in 1889, and director
of the Centro’s periodical in 1893, formed part of the 1891 and 1894 Bermúdez’
cabinets. 21 Admiral Lizardo Montero and Lieutenant Colonel Manuel Eduardo Lecca
were members of both the Centro and the Constitutional party. General Manuel Velarde
also belonged to both the Centro and the Constitutio nal party and had participated in
Cáceres’ 1886 cabinet and Morales’ 1893. 22
Colonel Guillermo Ferreyros, member of the Centro and the Constitutional
party, held cabinet posts under Cáceres in 1889 and 1890. Ferreyros also functioned as
secretary for the Borgoño transitional administration in 1894, between the death of
president Morales Bermúdez and the election of Cáceres for a second presidential term.
Another member, General Javier de Osma, was part of Cáceres’s cabinet in 1884 and
1894.23 Colonel Francisco de Paula Secada, member of the Constitutional Party and the
Centro had been commandant- in-chief of Cáceres’ resistance army during the War of
Independence. In 1890, Paula y Secada became part of Cáceres’ cabinet. 24
Other members of the Centro linked the caceristas with the professionalization
of the armed forces. Colonel Nicanor Ruiz de Somocurcio, member of the Centro,
directed the Escuela de Clases – school for the enlisted personnel - from its reopening
in 1888, after the war, until 1893 when Morales Bermúdez appointed him Secretary of
War. Colonel Ernesto La Combe, who had been Cáceres’ engineer during the
20
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resistance, and Sergeant Major Manuel Pío Alcalá, survivor of the Tarapacá campaign,
both members of the Centro, functioned as sub-director and third chief of the Escuela,
respectively. Colonel Juan Norberto Eléspuru, also member of the Centro, directed the
Military School for cadets from its opening in 1890 until 1894, when Piérola won the
civil war that deposed Cáceres. 25
The Centro published the Revista Militar y Naval from April 1888 to July 1893.
Among the articles about new weaponry, improved vessels, military tactics, and foreign
military organizations, the editors of the Revista dedicated many pages to defend the
armed forces’ broad role in society while attempting, at the same time, to establish the
Centro as the formal representative of the military institution. In the Revista’s first
issue, the editors enunciated the mission of the Centro pledging “to represent the
interests of the career of arms, make available modern professional knowledge, and
encourage the practice of the military ethic” crucial in the betterment of the armed
forces and the country’s defense. 26 Two issues later, the editors argued that national
stability and international prestige depended on the “efficient organization and
development of the country’s military institutions.”27
One of the recurring themes in the Revista was the identification of the armed
forces with the nation’s interests. This identification, claimed since the war of
independence by military officers, intensified in the political context of 1888 when the
Civilista Party and the Democratic Party initiated their campaigns for the 1890
presidential elections. In an article titled “Antimilitarism,” Colonel Francisco de Paula
Secada responded to those who called for the elimination of the army due to its cost,
25
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questioned morality, and efficacy. After arguing the indispensability of the armed forces
in matters of external and internal defense, Paula Secada rejected the idea of military
responsibility for the disastrous War of the Pacific, blaming it on civilian politicians
who allegedly had denied the funding and undermined military morale. “It is
deplorable,” he exclaimed, “the way in which the congresses dealt with the army and
the salaries of its members in the heated discussions about the national budget, the
virulent diatribes and insults with which they overwhelmed the army and the military
men, calling them leeches of the Nation.” He continued blaming congress and the
country in general for Peru’s military decadence because once a revolutionary faction
triumphed, the military officers who remained loyal to the legal government typically
lost their commissions. Some military personnel had been part of the political turmoil,
but they, he insisted, did not represent the army. In general, he concluded, military
officers had played a progressive role as prefects and subprefects creating schools,
dams, markets, roads, based on their diligence and zealous dedication. 28
As the political campaign for the 1890 elections heated up, the Revista defended
the military’s indispensable role in society and the view of the army as a microcosm of
society. The section “Eco del Ejército” complaint about a well- coordinated effort to
reduce the army to impotence. “In no other place would acts destined to weaken the
career of arms, devoted to the defense and security of the State, be tolerated; moreover,
such acts would be interpreted as treason.” The army represented the defender of the
basic principle of Peru’s political system, he asserted. “Is this maybe the reason why the
army is seen as an obstacle to the establishment of the republic in an opposite set of
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principles, such as the predominance of some group or caste with an oligarchic
tendency?”29 Such commentary alluded to the elitist tendencies of the Civilista Party,
which had lost its popular appeal of the 1870s.
In another issue, the “Eco del Ejército” conferred on the armed forces almost the
same status as the other three branches of government. This interpretation of the
military role resulted from the constitutional mandate that the armed forces should
protect the political system by conserving internal order. 30 “The army, as the first and
most noble institution of the republic after the three powers that exercise sovereignty,
believes that it has the duty to warn, with patriotism and zeal for the honor of the patria,
of the dangers that threaten the country . . .” And one of those dangers, the journal
suggested, was a congress composed of “unprepared” individuals “openly hostile” to
the armed forces. 31
In following issues, the “Eco del Ejército” continued the warnings against
civilian incapacity to deal with national security matters. “Those swindlers, shoddy
acting politicians believe . . . that war can be undertaken without preparation.”
However, the section also stressed the responsibility of the divided officer class in the
weakness of the military institution. “If the officers and military leaders had remained
united, understanding their duties toward the fatherland, the legal regime of the
republic, and the military honor, as well as their personal interests, . . . those revolutions
would not have triumphed, the constitutional regime would have been strengthened in
the republic, and respect for the national institutions would have been followed by
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prestige, credit, and power for the nation; and the army would be today surrounded of
the respect and consideration it deserves as supporter of order, peace, and guarantees.”32
The “Eco del Ejército” continued to call on the unity of the officer class, “[the
army] should be constantly united, compact, solid, homogeneous . . . Our military men
seduced by the compliments of the demagogues, the everlasting promoters of the
civilian discords traduced in fratricide battles, in which the only blood running was the
one of the military man in observance of bastard aspirations, of egotistical interests
invoking social or political regeneration, these deluded military men helped the
politicians to be reduced, before long, to the more complete oblivion, misery, and
scoff.”33
With such statements, the Revista attempted to stop caudillismo against the
Constitutional Party’s control of the State. The armed forces should remain united under
the chief executive. Cáceres, and the following military presidents, resorted to several
authoritarian actions to suppress political opposition and win elections; however, they
always kept the constitutional façade justifying their actions as necessary to maintain
internal order. Consequently, Cáceres and his entourage manipulated the constitutional
provision for regimes of exception while claiming legal and legitimate representation of
the sovereign people. 34
Believing themselves the real patriotic sons of the nations, these military men
engaged in a corrupt interpretation of the constitution to support increasing authoritarian
measures. “Taking advantage of the peace it has procured to the country, [the army] is
reorganizing and reinvigorating its discipline, morality, and spirit, establishing itself as
32
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the strongest support and axle around which every regenerative movement has to rotate
and what the competent, patriotic, and well intentioned men of state . . . will have to use
to save this vessel, which the pusillanimous, those without temple of spirit or patriotic
warmth in their hearts, cold by the contact with gold, and profoundly egotistical, believe
to go to pique without remedy and are snatching its contents.”35
Nevertheless, not all members of the Centro or the Constitutional Party agreed
with the vision of Cáceres, Bermúdez, and Borgoño. In December 1890, during the
Bermúdez administration, Colonel Arturo Morales Toledo, member of the Centro, led
an unsuccessful revolt, which the government attributed to pierolista maneuvers. In
1893, Cáceres proclaimed his presidential candidacy for the following year, so
Bermúdez cracked down on the press in an effort to undermine the political opposition.
Early in 1893, the cabinet led by Carlos M. Elías, member of the Constitutional Party,
abruptly resigned for reasons that remained unclear; then in May, Manuel Velarde,
member of both the Centro and the Constitutional Party, resigned along with his
cabinet, citing a conflict of opinions about “the way the official action should be
guided.”36
Late in 1891, the officer Gabriel Velarde Alvarez published two articles in the
Revista, which formally attributed the army a civilizing role some five years before the
first French mission set foot in the country. 37 Although Lyautey’s “Do Role social de
l’officier,” which appeared in March 1891, might have influenced Velarde, the army
had performed an educational role in Peru throughout the century. As Nicolás de Piérola
put it, “the army had to be in Peru an important and efficient agent of civilization for the
35

RMN 26 (1 April 1889), 579. Italics in the original.
Basadre, Historia, VIII, 2094, 2099-2100.
37
RMN 87, 89 (15 October and 15 November 1891), 2025-27, 2071-73.
36

64

great majority of our population.”38 In 1904, then Lieutenant Colonel Gabriel Velarde
Alvarez would write “Civil Instruction of the Soldier” in the Boletín del Ministerio de
Guerra y Marina, offering a positive evaluation of the civilizing effect of the army in its
Indian conscripts. 39 Frederick M. Nunn and Daniel M. Masterson cite this 1904 article
as “early” proofs of Francophile Peruvian officers aping their teachers’ doctrines. 40
In 1891, Velarde Alvarez published in the Revista an article title “The Necessity
of a Military Spirit in the Army.” The main task, he said, was the urgent
professionalization of the army through education, unity, and discipline. And the nation
should support that effort, he declared, because the military men were sentinels of
Peru’s vital interests, a civilizing force within the national society. Indeed, “thousands
have awaken from the lethargy caused by their ignorance as a result of the continued
contact with comrades already civilized, the change of scenery, and the learning of the
Spanish language and the elementary teachings given at the garrisons . . .”41
Velarde Alvarez took up that same theme in a subsequent article stressing the
army’s contribution to the integration of the Indians into national society. “Is there any
other corporation that contributes more to the education of the population? ” he asked
rhetorically. “Who has taken charge of their education and civilization? No one, only an
institution slandered by those who fear it or do not understand it. If the army has been
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corrupted sometimes, as any other, in exchange it has delivered great goods to the
country.”42
In this way, the military mind of the post-1879 war stressed the ever-present
internal and external dangers threatening the nation, the urge ncy of developing a
powerful military institution, the importance of order and hierarchy, the supremacy of
society over the individual, and a role for the armed forces beyond strictly military
affairs. The military broad jurisdiction included administrative, nation-building, and
constitutional guardian roles.
It is thus clear that before the process of professionalization intensified in 1896
under French influence, the Peruvian military mind consisted of attitudes and
perspectives that attributed to the armed forces a broad responsibility in society,
including a civilizing one. Such broad responsibility originated in the nineteenthcentury political culture, which interpreted constitutional notions through traditional
lenses and a “direct democracy” logic. Expanded and refined during the twentieth
century by French and North American influence, this Peruvian military mind remained
essentially unchanged, justifying the military’s twentieth-century political interventions
and the Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces.
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CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSIONS
From 1896 until WWII, the Peruvian army underwent a steady process of
professionalization under French tutelage. New regulations modernized the military
institution while military schools elevated the personnel’s level of expertise and
corporate sense. French military doctrines, in tune with the nineteenth-century Peruvian
military mind, incorporated into the army’s professional ideology a broad social role.
Following nineteenth-century tradition, political factions turned to military
support to remain in or gain power during the 1900s. However, the politicization and
fractionalization in the officer corps did not reach the alarming levels of the prior
century due, in part, to the development of an independent military ideology, which
synthesized nineteenth-century military experience, French teachings, and North
American “civic action” postulates. This military ideology linked national defense to
nation-building, including economic development. It followed, therefore, that the army,
which supposedly embodied all the civic virtues and was a reservoir of expertise, should
play a leading role in that developmental effort. pending projects as intertwined with
national defense. In the midst of economic decline, popular mobilizations, and
denunciations of governmental actions against national interests, General Juan Velasco
Alvarado, commandant of the Joint Command, inaugurated the Revolutionary
Government of the Armed Forces in 1968. This long-term regime attempted to impose
from above the structural reforms necessary for stability and progress, following the
mandate of the contradictory Peruvian political culture: only authoritarianism can
protect republican and liberal notions.
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Nineteenth-century militarism is crucial to understanding Peruvian civil- military
relations and military political involvement during the twentieth century. Indeed, it was
the Era of the Caudillos that gave birth to the modern Peruvian military mind. The lack
of cohesion among the Peruvian elite before, during, and after the war of independence
along with the emergent political culture set the stage for the instability of the
nineteenth century, which nurtured caudillismo. Criollo regional and ideological
divergences impeded the formation of a ruling class capable of replacing the king’s
legitimating power with a constitution, while the republican language supported an
elitist, antidemocratic discourse where the idea of “nation” and “people”
asymmetrically incorporated different social groups.
The political vacuum and crisis of legitimacy following the war of independence
encouraged unregulated political competition transforming caudillo violence into an
essential part of politics. Each contending faction claimed to represent public opinion
against the abuses of the group in power, using the notion of popular sovereignty within
a “direct democracy” logic to justify revolutions. Political violence reduced the
legitimacy of any representative government, leaving unanswered the question of who
represented the sovereign people. Military officers claimed that the army was the best
representative of the people because it was a microcosm of society upholding the
perfect balance between equality and order, tradition and modernity.
Moreover, since Peruvian cons titutions employed competing set of principles
when establishing regimes of exception and designating the armed forces as defenders
of the political system and internal order, president-caudillos and revolutionaries
equally claimed to fulfill their constitutional duties when resorting to authoritarian
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measures against political opposition or when leading revolts against established
authorities.
A broad sense of responsibility toward the country, along with desires for
personal glory and power as well as different ideologies of what was best for the
country, encouraged military officers to participate in politics. Peruvian officers saw
themselves as the founding fathers of the republic called to protect it from anarchy.
Caudillismo encouraged the formation of a hybrid state utilizing modern
bureaucratic and traditional patrimonial practices. The control of the State by a
contending faction depended on the construction and maintenance of alliances that
could provide capital, men, supply, and “popular support” during revolts and civil wars.
Consequently, prefects, controlling the departamentos, became key political players.
Most prefects were military officers who obtained such posts from the president of the
republic as a reward for proven or expected loyalty. Most caudillos who ruled the
country had held previously a prefecture and, although they manipulated governmental
institutions, they did not control them completely. In this way, caudillos’ power, based
on shifting alliances, faced constant challenges keeping the states they built extremely
vulnerable.
The War of the Pacific (1879-1883) weakened the civilian sectors, which had
emerged in the 1860s and 1870s overcoming the liberal-conservative dichotomy, giving
way to militarism reminiscent of the early repub lic. However, this second militaristic
moment sprang from a defeat originating in Peru’s failure at nation-building.
General Andrés Avelino Cáceres, hero of the war, attempted to rule the country
through his Constitutional Party and the support of the army, transformed into a
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homogeneous political pressure group to deter caudillismo. The saviors of the
fatherland’s honor, the microcosm of society, should lead the country’s regeneration
process united under a military ideology that placed the nation above all else.
Although the Peruvian nineteenth-century military did not possess a strong
corporate sense, a high level of expertise or an ideology placing it under civilian
control, military practitioners believed their occupation to be in a professionalizing
state. Moreover, they formally claimed a broad jurisdiction based on the century’s
military experience as prefects, educators, and guardians of the constitution and the
nation’s interests.
Cáceres and his entourage embodied the Peruvian military mind, systematized
and spread by the Centro Militar del Perú and its Revista Militar y Naval (1888-1893).
The Revista dedicated many pages to the defense of a broad military role in society,
arguing that national interests were undistinguishable from those of the armed forces.
Before the advent of French instructors in 1896, the Peruvian military mind
already consisted of attitudes and perspectives that stressed the necessity of a strong
military, the supremacy of society over the individual, the destructiveness of civilian
partisan politics, and a broad military jurisdiction, which included administrative,
nation-building, civilizing, and constitutional guardian functions.
The roots of modern Peru’s professional militarism thus lay deep in the
country’s nineteenth century past.
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